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1.  Introduction 
 Copyright law as it relates to music is complex and often confusing.  Historical 
influences embodied within the United States Copyright Code can be traced as far back as 
Ancient Greece.
1
  Today, copyright law in the United States provides the owners of musical 
compositions and sound recordings with a sophisticated web of rights that can be lucrative when 
utilized effectively.  This bundle of rights that accompanies original works of music has grown in 
reaction to new technologies of media distribution and publication.  Technological advances 
ranging from the printing press to the player piano, to the compact-disk have influenced the ways 
in which music is disseminated and consumed.  Since 1790, the United States Congress has used 
positive law to reward copyright owners by expanding the exclusive rights vested in copyrights 
in ways that have increased the bargaining power of copyright owners each time new 
technologies affecting distribution of intellectual property are developed.  The trend of 
expanding copyright law has intensified in recent years.  Between 1975 and 2000, the Copyright 
code grew at an annual rate of 6.9%, ballooning from 22,310 words to an astounding 124,320 
words.
2
 
 The most recent technological advance resulting in an expansion of rights for music 
copyright owners is the internet.  Arguably, the internet is the most important and influential 
broadcast pipeline in music history.  It surpasses terrestrial radio as the most efficient and 
personalized transport mechanism for music because the internet facilitates traditional non-
interactive broadcasts, as well as interactive broadcasts, and direct purchases of music.  The 
internet allows music consumers to try music before purchasing it without leaving their homes.  
                                                          
1
 Michael W. Carrol Whose Music is it anyway?:  How we came to view musical expression as a form of property, 
72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1405, 1420 (2004). 
2
 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2 ( The 
AEI Press 2004). 
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During the fall of 2009, Ford Motor Company introduced the first internet console for the 
automobile.
3
  Internet radio can be streamed to iPhones and Blackberry smart phones.
4
  This is a 
sign that internet radio is migrating from the personal computer to more mobile devices, using 
cloud computing
5
 and other technologies to make the dream of a celestial jukebox a reality.
6
 
 Historically, governments have enacted legislation to expand the rights of copyright 
owners after an infringing technology has existed long enough to understand how to narrowly 
tailor legislation to address and solve only the existing problems with the infringing danger.  
Legislation addressing the infringing dangers of the internet on music compositions and sound 
recordings, however, was enacted before the problems could be adequately understood and 
before the recording industry could make simple adjustments to their business models to mitigate 
dangers posed by the internet and other digital technologies.
7
  The result has been a culture war 
pitting old technologies against new, producing a system of disparaging law that unfairly and 
unwisely discriminates against music based internet technologies.  It did not have to be this way.  
Throughout the early and mid 1990’s, a handful of music industry insiders urged executives to 
adjust business goals to gain a market share in the coming digital world.
8
  Blinded by short term 
profits earned during the heyday of the compact-disc, executives chose to cling to their business 
model and fight making the inevitable transition to superior digital formats.
9
 
                                                          
3
 Ashlee Vance and Matt Richtel, Despite Risks, Internet Creeps Onto Car Dashboards, New York Times, January 
6, 2010.  Available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/07/technology/07distracted.html 
4
 Meg Tirrell Pandora Media Founder Sees Company’s First Profit Next Year, Bloomberg, May 19, 2009.   
available at  http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aaKvHKT2hji0. 
5
 Let it Rise, The Economist, October 25, 2008 (explaining, the concept of “cloud computing” as making digital 
content accessible from anywhere, rather than a single hard-drive device). 
6
 Charles C. Mann, The Heavenly Jukebox, September 2009, http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2009/09/mann.htm. 
7
 Larry Lessig, FREE CULTURE; THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY 297-298 (Penguin Books 2004). 
8
 Seth Mnookin, Universal’s CEO Once Called iPod Users Thieves.  Now He’s Giving Songs Away, Wired 
Magazine, Nov. 27, 2007. 
9
 Id. 
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 The following pages analyze the history and current state of disparity in laws that have 
stifled the growth of internet radio technologies.  Internet radio has the potential to be the most 
revolutionary technology to aid composers of music and sound recording artists in publishing, 
distributing, and popularizing their music.  This paper begins by looking at the history of how 
music gained property rights and developed copyright protection.  Within this history, a 
complicated system of interests in various income streams associated with music are explained.  
The second section looks at the history of terrestrial radio and its influence on copyright law.  In 
the third part, the paper outlines the various formats of internet radio and looks at the myriad of 
laws effecting internet music technologies.  The discussion begins by looking at the Digital 
Performance Rights in Sound Recording Act of 1995 and extends to current royalty rates and per 
station fees imposed on internet radio.  Next, the paper explores many of the benefits and 
challenges facing internet radio businesses and the ways in which these internet companies have 
worked to form a community of support.  The paper concludes by briefly offering proposals for 
future legislation and future business models that can help internet radio and the recording 
industry coexist.  Working with the current framework of copyright law, it is possible to foster 
growth in internet radio while enabling musicians and recording companies to generate fair 
revenues. 
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I.  Overview of Copyrights in Sound Recordings  
 Music has long been treated as a form of property.  Determining the rights that should be 
associated with music ownership is difficult for several reasons.  The initial obstacle is simply 
defining “music.”  Music is a reflection of cultural norms, and consists of sounds that are 
designated as “music” rather than “noise.10”  Defining music for the purposes of law requires 
imposition of rules and order, together with forms of notation, recording, or other documentation 
to preserve music so it may be reproduced.
11
  Technology has always been the driving force 
behind the evolution of the music business.  It influences the ways in which music is 
memorialized, produced, reproduced, disseminated, consumed, and therefore defined.  Over the 
course of several centuries, the rights vested in music compositions and recordings have 
increased, so as to resemble those characteristics associated with real estate and other more 
tangible properties.
12
  Legislators and courts have recognized more rights in music in reaction to 
developments in technology that have increased the ease of preserving music in the form 
envisioned by content creators.   
 Law professor Michael Carrol defines the three conditions of music being treated as 
property as “(1) those associated with the production or distribution claim a proprietary 
relationship with music; (2) those who make proprietary claims also claim a right to receive 
attribution in connection with the music or to prohibit or control the reproduction, distribution, or 
performance of ‘their’ music by others; and (3) these claims of control are recognized and 
vindicated by law.
13”  Music had a long road to travel before it could be claimed and treated as 
                                                          
10
 Carrol, supra note 1, at 1416. 
11
 Id. 
12
 Id. 
13
 Id. at 1418. 
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property.  Among the chief advances necessary was developing a system of documenting 
original musical works in written form. 
 A.  Music as Property, a Historical Perspective 
 Musical notation existed at least as far back as the fourth century B.C.E. in Ancient 
Greece.
14
  Music notation during this period was descriptive in nature, meaning that notes were 
described in relation to one another but pitch and tempo were determined by the performer rather 
than the composer.
15
  Descriptive music notation increased the likelihood that no two musical 
performances would be identical.  It was not until the middle ages, nearly 1,000 years later, that 
notation was refined through institutionalization of the church.
16
     
 Under Pope Gregory I (590-604), the Church established an official catalog of songs to 
be used as the exclusive music of the Christian Church.
17
  It was during this time that music 
notation began to change from being descriptive in nature to being prescriptive.  In an effort to 
standardize and regulate music used for church activity, pitch became defined and notated in 
written scores.
18
  Later, during the eleventh century, the modern staff notation for writing music 
was developed.  The modern staff continued to evolve through the thirteenth century, at which 
time tempo and note length were first written.
19
  Contemporaneous to these developments was 
the growth of the medieval city and performing arts guilds.  Cities began to treat labor and music 
as a commodity by granting performance guilds the exclusive right to perform music at public 
gatherings.
20
  Until the advent of the printing press, performance of music remained more highly 
                                                          
14
 Id. at 1420. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Id. at 1433. 
17
 Id. at 1440. 
18
 Id. at 1441. 
19
 Id. at 1441-1442. 
20
 Id. at 1447. 
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regarded than music composition and it was common for composers not to claim ownership or 
sign their names to original works.
21
 
 Perhaps the greatest invention for the evolution of modern society occurred in 1451, 
when Gutenberg invented the movable type printing press.
22
  The Guttenberg printing press 
made reproduction and distribution of printable works economically viable, while triggering a 
significant expansion in the number of people who became literate.  Increases in literacy rates 
and accessibility to printed music produced a growing class of professional and leisure musicians 
who consumed sheet music.
23
  New businesses developed to pursue new market opportunities.  
In 1501, Ottaviano de’ Petrucci of Venice became the most prominent music publisher, proving 
that a market existed for the sale of sheet music.
24
  In the years leading up to and following the 
rise of Ottaviano de’ Petrucci’s publishing business, governments throughout Europe began 
issuing exclusive publishing rights to printers in order to incentivize investment in publishing 
businesses and technologies.
25
  Publishers controlled access and bargaining power over the 
dissemination of works.  Composers would often be commissioned to write works through 
indentured relationships with wealthy patrons.
26
  In exchange for their financial support, 
financiers of written works would often receive a dedication, authorship credit, or title to the 
finished work.
27
   
 Over time, persons associated with the production or distribution of music compositions 
began seeking authorship and ownership attribution.
28
  Publishers contracted to hold an exclusive 
                                                          
21
Id. at 1440. 
22
 Al Kohn & Bob Kohn KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 3
rd
 ED. 619 (Aspen Law & Business 2002). 
23
 Carrol, supra note 1, at 1460. 
24
 Kohn & Kohn, supra note 22, at 619. 
25
 Carrol, supra note 1, at 1460. 
26
 Note, Exploitative Publishers, Untrustworthy Systems, and The Dream of a Digital Revolution For Artists, 114 
Harv. L. Rev. 2438 (2001). 
27
 Id. 
28
 Carrol, supra note 1, at 1460. 
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right to publish the musical composition in a geographical region, and the financier was typically 
the sole beneficiary of royalties from the sale of printed compositions.
29
  By encouraging growth 
and investment in new technologies, European governments achieved a societal goal of fostering 
new creative arts.  The increased ease of publication brought about Professor Carol’s second 
stage of music being treated as property.  Those with authorship and ownership claims over 
original works were now seeking control over the subsequent printing, distribution, and income 
derived from such works.
30
 
 Copyright law in the United States of America draws direct lineage from England.  In 
1662, the British Kingdom first began issuing formal copyrights under the Licensing Act.
31
  
Copyright law grew out of the publishing industry.  Technological innovation influenced change 
in business models, which led to new law intended to foster business and technology.  The 
Licensing Act utilized the growing market for title in written works by granting publishers the 
exclusive right to print certain works.
32
  This statute was later replaced in 1710 by the Statute of 
Anne, which granted publishers a 14 year term of copyright exclusivity.
33
  The Statute of Anne is 
viewed by many as the primary influence on copyright law in America.  The statute enabled 
musical composition authors and owners the right to control attribution, reproduction, and 
transferability of original printable works.
34
  Publishers began purchasing copyrights from 
authors, entitling publishers to be the sole beneficiary of profits obtained through the exploitation 
and sale of an author’s work.35  As the first significant copyright statute, The Statute of Anne 
was narrow in scope, and sought to afford rights to offset risks of injury being caused at that time 
                                                          
29
Id. at 1470. 
30
Id. at 1418. 
31
 Lessig, supra note 7, at 86. 
32
 Note, supra note 26, at 2439. 
33
 Lessig, supra note 7, at 86. 
34
 Id. 
35
 Id. at 85-90. 
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by new technologies.
36
  The statute was narrowly tailored and limited to the right to use a 
specific machine to replicate a specific work.
37
 
 In the United States, the power of Congress to enact copyright law is secured in Article I 
Section 8 of the Constitution.
38
  In 1790, Congress first exercised this power by creating a 
secured renewable 14 year copyright.
39
  During the first hundred years of America’s existence 
there were hardly any significant technological advances nor copyright amendments having 
effect on the rights of music owners.  Between 1451 and the late 1880’s composers transitioned 
to claim authorship credit and derive income for their works through the sale of sheet music.
40
  
Public performance by local and touring musicians remained the primary vehicle for 
popularizing and advertising music.  The advent of the player piano in the 1880’s revolutionized 
the way music was performed and consumed in public, and became the first musical technology 
advance in American history to trigger an amendment to the  copyright code. 
 The player piano offered the first income producing means to record and reproduce a 
song.
41
  A player piano is a piano equipped with a mechanical component that uses air pressure 
to play a piano’s keys as dictated by depressions in a printed piano roll.42  Pubs and restaurants 
began purchasing player pianos as a relatively inexpensive way to reproduce perfectly performed 
music that was familiar to patrons.  Use of player pianos increased the sale of sheet music and 
helped to promote a culture of popular music by reproducing familiar songs with perfect 
consistency.  After gaining notoriety from being performed publicly by live musicians as well as 
player pianos, “After the ball” by Charles K. Harris became the first song to sell one million 
                                                          
36
 Id. 
37
 Id. at 87. 
38
 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
39
 Lessig, supra note 7, at 133. 
40
Mathew S. DelNero, Music: Long Overdue?: An Exploration of the Status and Merit of a General Public 
Performance Right in Sound Recordings 6 Vand J. Ent. L. & Prac. 181, 183 (2004). 
41
 Id. 
42
 Kohn & Kohn, supra note 22, at 682. 
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copies of sheet music in 1893.
43
  In 1902 there were approximately 75,000 player pianos and 1.5 
million perforated music rolls in use in the United States.
44
 
 Under early American copyright law, composers held the exclusive right to reproduce 
original sheet music.  For music composition owners, there existed an open question of law as to 
whether the reproduction of piano rolls invoked the copyright holder’s exclusive right to 
reproduce printed music.  In 1908, the Supreme Court distinguished a composition owner’s 
exclusive right to reproduce original written music from the act of reproducing audio renditions 
of their original music.
45
  In White-Smith Music Publishing Company v. Apollo Company, the 
court determined that the copyright code granted composers the exclusive right to reproduce 
original sheet music, but did not protect audio reproductions of compositions.  Justice Day wrote 
“these musical tones are not a copy which appeals to the eye.”46  The court created a distinction 
between copyright protection based upon which of the five senses a work of music directly 
appealed to.  This distinction separating mechanical and sheet music reproductions did not last 
long.  White-Smith Music Publishing Company v. Apollo Company remains a historically 
significant case because it established that rights in sound recordings do not necessarily mimic 
those rights held in printed transcripts of original works. 
 Within a year of the Supreme Court’s decision, Congress legislated to overrule the 
Supreme Court by explicitly granting copyright owners of sheet music the exclusive right to 
make mechanical reproductions of their songs.
47
  Contemporaneous to the granting of an 
exclusive mechanical reproduction right, Congress provided a compulsory mechanical license 
                                                          
43
 Kohn & Kohn, supra note 22, at 620. 
44
 White-Smith Music Publishing Company v. Apollo Company 209 U.S. 1, 9 (1908) 
45
 Id. 
46
Id. at 17. 
47
Kohn & Kohn, supra note 22, at 682. 
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for manufacturers of piano rolls and other mechanical music playing devices.
48
  The compulsory 
license provided a creative mechanism to combat a near monopoly held by the piano roll 
producer The Aeolian Co.  In the early 1900’s, The Aeolian Co. held an abundance of exclusive 
contracts with music publishers for the right to make mechanical reproductions of their works.
49
  
The copyright office, empowered by Congress, would set a statutory royalty rate paid to 
composition copyright holders for each reproduction of their works.  A compulsory mechanical 
license remains in existence today and is codified under § 115 and § 801of the copyright code.50  
As with the relationship between publishing and early copyright law, the player piano provides 
another example of how technological innovation influenced change in business models, which 
led to new law intended to foster the interaction of business and technology.     
 Modern American copyright law divides the copyrights of a musical work into two 
distinct parts.  There are distinct rights held in the composition of a song and distinct rights held 
in the sound recording of a song.
51
  Often times the sound recording copyright is owned by a 
different party than the composition copyright.
52
  Composition copyright owners entitled to 
mechanical license royalties typically contract with a music publishing company to administer 
their publishing rights.
53
  Publishers regularly receive 50% of mechanical license royalties in 
exchange for administering the publishing rights of a song.
54
  The mechanical license for non 
digital music reproductions is administered by the government affiliated Harry Fox Agency.
55
  
The Copyright Office periodically increases the rate that must be paid per song for the 
                                                          
48
 Id. 
49
 Id. 
50
 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1976). 17 U.S.C. § 801 (1976). 
51
 Shane Wagman, Changing Face of Copyright Law 17 J. Intell. Prop. L. 95, 100 (2009). 
52
 Donald Passman, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 218 (Free Press 7th ed. 2009). 
53
 Id. at 221. 
54
 Andrey Spector, How Choruss can Turn Into a Cacophony: The Record Industry’s Stranglehold on the Future of 
Music Business 16 Rich. J. L. & Tech. 3, 20 (2009). 
55
 Id. 
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mechanical license.  In 1976 the rate was 2.75 cents per song, the most recent rate was set at 9.1 
cents per song in 2008.
56
  Royalties resulting from digital sales and performances of music are 
collected by SoundExchange, an independent organization originally founded by the Recording 
Industry Association of America (RIAA) and currently representing more than 3,500 record 
companies.
57
 
 The bundle of rights held by composition copyright owners was growing rapidly in the 
years surrounding the start of the twentieth century.  Since 1887, composition copyright owners 
held the exclusive right to public performance of their works.
58
  After the 1909 amendment, 
copyright holders were entitled to a royalty for the reproduction and sale of their sheet music or 
mechanical musical reproduction tool, and for the public performance of music played by 
machine or person.
59
  Composers nonetheless faced a dilemma, while congress provided 
copyright owners with an easy way to collect mechanical copyrights, enforcing the public 
performance right had been far more difficult but represented a large untapped form of income. 
 
 B.  Performing Rights Organizations; the PRO’s 
 According to legend, a group of lawyers and composers including Victor Herbert, Irving 
Berlin, and John Philip Sousa were eating dinner at The Lambs restaurant in New York City 
when they began discussing the need for an efficient means to enforce their exclusive right to 
public performance of musical compositions.
60
  Collectively these songwriters have made some 
of the most significant contributions to American music, including the songs “White Christmas,” 
                                                          
56
 Id. 
57
 SoundExchange Frequently Asked Questions,  http://soundexchange.com/category/faq/#question-428 (last visited 
April 6, 2010). 
58
 Kohn & Kohn, supra note 22, at 904. 
59
 Id. at 682. 
60
 Id. at 903. 
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“God Bless America,” “Semper Fidelis,” and “Stars and Stripes Forever.”  The group discussed 
the two main reasons composers failed to enforce their exclusive right to public performance of 
their compositions for the first fifteen years the right existed.  First, it was widely believed that 
public performance was the key to driving sales of sheet music.
61
  Sheet music had long been the 
most reliable form of songwriter income, and songwriters had learned to be dependent upon the 
regime that had long been in place.
62
  The second reason the right had not been enforced was the 
impracticality of thousands of individual copyright owners attempting to collect public 
performance royalties from thousands of nightclubs and community music venues.  This dinner 
meeting concluded with the formation of the first collective performance arts organization, 
“intended to prevent the playing of all copyrighted music at any public function unless a royalty 
was paid.”63 
 Under the current § 106 of the Copyright Act, composers have the exclusive right to 
perform and authorize others to perform their works publicly.
64
  Born out of the ambition of 
composers, the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) became the 
model performance rights organization (PRO) and established the business model used to 
enforce § 106 of the Copyright Act.  Beginning in 1922, ASCAP started collecting a $250 
licensing fee from radio stations on behalf of composers whose music was being broadcast.
65
  
Until 1940, ASCAP held a monopoly as the sole enforcer of public performance rights.
66
  
Broadcast Music Incorporated (BMI) formed in December of 1940 in anticipation of failed 
                                                          
61
 Mathew S. Del Nero, Music:  Long Overdue?:  An Exploration of the Status and Merit of a General Public 
Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 6 Vand. J. Ent. L. & Prac. 181, 183 (2004). 
62
Id. 
63
Russell Sanjek & David Sanjek, PENNIES FROM HEAVEN xv (Da Capo Press 1996) (citing Trust for Control of 
Music Business: ASCAP Organized at Meeting Here, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 14, 1914). 
64
 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976). 
65
 Allison Kidd Recent Development: Mending the Tear in the Internet Radio Community:  A Call for a legislative 
Band-Aid 4 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 339, 346 (2003). 
66
 Kohn & Kohn, supra note 22, at 907. 
16 | P a g e  
 
licensing negotiations between ASCAP and radio broadcasters.
67
  When broadcasters refused to 
pay increased licensing fees demanded by ASCAP for the right to broadcast music in their 
catalogue, BMI stepped in offering a new catalogue of less well known music for a more 
reasonable licensing rate.
68
  Beginning in January 1941, BMI struck several licensing deals as a 
replacement option for those broadcasters who could not reach agreement with ASCAP.
69
   
 Today ASCAP coexists with BMI and the Society of European Stage Authors & 
Composers (SESAC) as the three PRO’s that collect public performance royalties on behalf of 
composition owners each time their works are performed publicly in the United States.
70
  The 
influence of these organizations is widely felt throughout the music industry because the 
composers, their music publishers, and broadcasters of music must do business with the PROs in 
order to fulfill their goal of enforcing their exclusive right in public performance afforded under 
the Copyright code.
71
  Upon joining a performance rights organization, the songwriter transfers 
the nonexclusive right to license non-dramatic public performances of its songs to the 
organization.
72
  PRO’s assume three primary responsibilities (1) Issuance of licenses and the 
collection of licensing fees, (2) monitoring of public performances of music, (3) paying 
songwriters and publishers based upon the number of times their music is performed publicly.
73
   
 The reach of § 110 of the Copyright Act is very broad.74  To perform music publicly is to 
(1) “perform… it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of 
persons outside of a normal circle of family and its social acquaintances is gathered” or (2) “to 
                                                          
67
 Id. 
68
 Id. 
69
 Id. 
70
 Jonathan Cardi, Uber-Middleman: Reshaping the Broken Landscape of Music Copyright 92 Iowa L. Rev. 835, 
839 (2007). 
71
 David J. Moser, MUSIC COPYRIGHT FOR THE NEW MILLENIUM 76-79 (Artistpro, 2001). 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id. 
74
 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1976). 
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transmit or otherwise communicate a performance… of the work to a place specified by clause 
or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable 
of receiving the performance receive it in the same place or in separate places at the same or 
different times.”75   
 The public performance right granted to composers applies to four categories of public 
performance.  (1) Anytime a work is performed in a public location, including all places where 
the general public is free to access regardless of how many people are present and regardless of 
whether an admission fee is charged to be at the location.  (2)  Any time a work is performed at a 
location where a “substantial” number of people other than family and friends are gathered.  (3) 
Anytime a work is transmitted to a public place by a device enabling images or sound to be 
received beyond the original broadcasting location.  (4) Anytime a work is transmitted by a 
device with the potential to be received and viewed or listened to, regardless of whether the 
public receives the broadcast transmission is actually received and consumed.
76
 Currently, the 
three PROs collect more than $1 billion in performance royalties on an annual basis.
77
  Most 
commonly, broadcasters of music are issued blanket licenses on an annual basis, giving the 
licensee the right to publicly perform any music in the PROs catalog an unlimited number of 
times.
78
  The rate paid for a blanket license varies depending on the type of business and type of 
broadcast.  Radio stations and television stations pay more for the right to broadcast music than 
do bars and shopping outlets.  Radio and television outlets typically pay 2% of their adjusted 
gross receipts to obtain a blanket license, while most other business are charged a flat fee 
                                                          
75
 Kohn & Kohn, supra note 22, at 909. 
76
 Moser, supra note 71, at 76-79. 
77
 Del Nero, supra note 61, at 184. 
78
 Moser, supra note 71, at 76-79. 
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negotiated in advance.
79
  Each PRO uses its own formula to assign a value or weight to different 
performances.
80
  Factors considered when royalties are paid include the size of a potential 
audience, the time of day a performance occurs, and the type of performance broadcast.
81
  
Composers and publishers are then paid royalties based upon the number of performances and 
the weighted value accorded to each performance.  ASCAP and BMI are registered not for profit 
organizations, while SESAC is a for profit corporation.
82
  The two not for profit PROs typically 
distribute 80-85% of licensing fees collected annually to their composers, while SESAC 
distributes 50-60% of licensing fees to its artists.
83
  When fees are distributed by the PROs, 50% 
is paid to the composer and 50% is paid to the music publisher the composer has contracted 
with.
84
 
 C. Record Companies 
 Record companies primarily serve the function of financing, promoting, and distributing 
music recordings.  In a typical recording contract, an artist transfers the copyright in their sound 
recordings to a record company in exchange for an advance sum of money that is used to finance 
the recording process and living expenses of the artist.
85
  An artist will often receive between 
thirteen and twenty percentage “points” as a royalty from the sale of its music.86  Before 
receiving any royalty income on the sale of music, the entire advance must be recouped through 
album sales.
87
  Unlike a typical loan arrangement where the debtor retains the value of their 
investment once it is paid off (i.e. house, education), the record company stands to earn back its 
                                                          
79
 Cardi, supra note 70, at 846. 
80
 Moser, supra note 71, at 76-79. 
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invested advance and retain ownership of a band’s work product as well as 80-87% of future 
income derived from that band’s sound recordings.88 
 Record labels take significant risk when investing in new artists.  In addition to paying an 
artist’s advance, it is common for record labels to fund promotional costs behind a single album 
that include investments in the range of $50,000 for print advertisements, $400,000 for radio 
promotion, and $600,000-$1,000,000 to produce a music video.
89
  Income derived by record 
companies comes from the exploitation of sound recording copyrights, primarily through the sale 
of records.  In the past, record companies have benefited from periodic technological advances 
that lead to a change in the format consumers used to listen to music.
90
  Millions of people have 
purchased albums by bands such as Pink Floyd and the Beatles on vinyl, cassette tape, and CD.  
Since the advent of the MP3 and the technology enabling CD owners to convert audio files to 
MP3 files, the need for repeat purchases has been abolished.
91
  Since 1999 the four major music 
recording labels Sony-BMG, EMI, Warner Music Group, and Universal Music Group have 
experienced significant declines in revenue.  It is suggested by many that decreases in revenue 
have resulted from the failure of these industry leading labels to adjust their business models to 
operate efficiently in the digital age.
92
   
 Record companies used to have more control over their business model.  Companies used 
legal, illegal, and grey area tactics to exercise substantial influence over music played on 
American radio.
93
  Radio served the purpose of advertising for the sale of sound recordings, 
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which in turn created record company profits.
94
  Prior to the sale of MP3’s over the internet, 
recording companies acted as gatekeepers with the power to control what music was available in 
America’s record stores.95  During a five year period in the 1990’s, record companies inflated 
their revenue by pressuring retail stores to raise the price of the typical CD from $13.95 to $18.
96
  
In February 2008, Apple Inc.’s iTunes became the largest music retailer. 97  iTunes enables 
people to purchase music from the comfort of their home or any location with an internet 
connection.  Music can be purchased from iTunes for $9.99 an album, or at a per song rate 
ranging from $0.69 to $1.29.
98
  Record companies save a substantial sum of money by 
eliminating the cost of physical production and distribution of CD’s, however the savings have 
not solved the recording industry’s crisis of falling revenue. 
 Thirteen years before iTunes became the largest music retailer, recording companies 
sensed the coming of a digital age.  Since 1995, as the proud owners of sound recording 
copyrights, record labels have earned revenue when their sound recordings are broadcast on the 
internet.  This right does not exist when songs are broadcast on terrestrial radio.  The laws that 
shape internet radio were influenced greatly by relationships between recording companies and 
terrestrial radio stations.  These laws were shaped differently than those copyright laws arising 
from the printing press and player piano inventions.  Here, laws were drafted before technology 
and business models matured or influenced distribution and consumption of intellectual property. 
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II. The Important Role of Radio 
 A.  Historical Rise of Radio and Federal Regulation 
 Radio broadcast technology was invented by Italian physicist Guglielmo Marconi in 
1895.
99
  The technology allows sound and images to be transmitted wirelessly by electrical 
energy over the radio wave spectrum.
100
  An early problem with radio was static and overlapping 
broadcast interference caused by multiple broadcasts over the same waves.
101
 In 1912 Congress 
passed the first Radio Act with the goal of regulating broadcasts and curbing static 
interference.
102
  The Radio Act of 1912 required radio operators to apply for a license issued by 
the Secretary of Commerce and Labor in order to legally broadcast.
103
  Four companies owning 
patents for most of the electrical equipment necessary to produce radio equipment joined forces 
to establish the Radio Corporation of America (RCA).
104
  RCA and its subsidiary companies 
controlled most of the early radio programming, and made its profits only from the sale of radio 
units.  In 1922 not one of the 400 licensed radio stations in America sold advertising time during 
their broadcasts.
105
 
 Washington Senator Clarence Dill introduced the Radio Act of 1927, as a replacement to 
the 1912 Act.
106
  Under the 1927 Act, the  newly formed Federal Radio Commission (FRC) was 
empowered to regulate radio waves and issue limited term licenses for station operation.
107
  By 
this time, advertisers established a presence on the radio.  A lasting contribution and regulation 
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present in the Radio Act of 1927 was a requirement that any sponsored broadcast required an 
accompanying announcement disclaiming who paid for the broadcast material to be aired.
108
  
Regulations issued by the FRC reflected a tradition of thought known as the “Public Interest 
Doctrine.”109  First articulated by Herbert Hoover during his tenure as the Secretary of 
Commerce under Presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge in the 1920’s, the doctrine 
views radio operators as public trustees with a duty to put the public interest ahead of their own 
business interests.
110
  The FRC was replaced by the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) in the Communications Act of 1934.
111
 
 When the Communications Act of 1934 was passed, ninety-eight percent of broadcasting 
stations were commercialized.
112
  As profits increased from radio advertisements, ownership of 
stations became consolidated.
113
  The FCC established Chain Broadcasting Rules setting limits to 
the ownership of stations and exclusivity of broadcasting content.
114
  In 1953, no single entity 
could own more than 14 radio stations.
115
  The goal of the regulations was to further the public 
interest doctrine and assure that consumers received a wide range of programming content and 
views.  Since its inception, the FCC has made clear that disclosure of advertising and limitations 
on station ownership are principles necessary to maintain the public interest in broadcast radio 
and free speech. 
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 B. Payola and the Recording Industry’s Relationship with Radio. 
 
 “Payola” is a term of art first introduced in a 1938 article in the trade magazine 
Variety.
116
  The term refers to the practice of recording companies making undisclosed payments 
of cash or kind in return for the broadcast of certain music in radio broadcasts.
117
  The practice of 
paying others to perform one’s music dates back to the 1800’s when the owners of copyrights in 
sheet music would pay band leaders to perform and popularize their songs in an effort to increase 
sales of sheet music and royalty payments.
118
  Radio became the ultimate advertising instrument 
for corporations because the public can hear what is played in their homes, cars, and anywhere 
else a radio is present.  Radio airplay is viewed by the recording industry as advertising for new 
albums,
119
 providing consumers of radio the benefit of previewing a product before purchasing 
it.  Because record companies typically own copyrights in the sound recordings of their artists, 
but not the song compositions, record company revenue is driven by royalties earned on album 
sales while no income is directly generated from radio play.
120
   
 In the 1950’s, payola grew rampant between recording labels and radio disk jockeys due 
in large part to supply and demand economic conditions.
121
   In exchange for playing records, 
individual disc jockeys were given cash payments, royalties, and other lavish gifts that in some 
cases doubled their salaries.
122
  Because there are more songs produced than there exists time to 
play them on the radio, payola worked as a pricing mechanism dividing the scarce resource of 
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radio airtime to those songs that record companies would pay the most to get played.
123
  Of all 
the disc jockey’s who took bribes, Alan Freed became the most famous after he was indicted on 
May 19, 1960 and charged with taking bribes to play records.
124
  Freed pled guilty to accepting a 
total of $2,500 in bribes, but omitted stating that he was given writing credit for Chuck Berry’s 
first hit “Maybellene” by executives at the Chess Brothers recording company in exchange for 
playing the song and promoting it to hit single status.
125
 
 Following the Alan Freed scandal, Congress amended the FCC regulations in 1960 to 
more directly penalize and discourage pay-for-play arrangements.  The most notable changes 
were to § 317 and § 508 of the statute.126  The changes require that radio stations disclose to the 
public at the time of broadcast, any receipt of significant consideration in exchange for 
broadcasting certain content.
127
  Station employees are also required to notify the licensee when 
consideration is exchanged for broadcasting content.
128
  The articulated reasons for the policy 
change is to inform the public that it is hearing music that was paid for, so the radio audience 
knows who is attempting to persuade it.
129
  Record labels and radio station employees found to 
be in violation of the disclosure requirement can be subject to criminal penalties of up to a year 
in jail and fines of up to $10,000.
130
  At no time has Congress made it illegal for record 
companies to compensate radio stations for playing music, it is simply mandated that any fund 
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transfers are disclosed so as not to mislead the public into believing the music is being played 
solely for its artistic or commercial merit.
131
 
 In the aftermath of the Alan Freed payola scandal pay-for-play did not stop, but it became 
more sophisticated and indirect.  Record companies began circumventing the payola statutes by 
subcontracting with independent promoters who acted as brokers for hit singles backed by record 
label support.
132
  A Group of fewer than 30 independent promoters known collectively as “The 
Network” had direct connections to the 41 most important radio stations in the 24 most 
influential radio stations in America.
133
  The Network funneled large sums of money to radio 
stations in exchange for radio play, often keeping thousands of dollars as a brokering fee.
134
 
 During the 1980’s independent promotion became the surefire way to guarantee a hit 
single.  Even top artists such as Michael Jackson used independent promotion to get songs 
played on the radio.
135
  Jackson’s manager Frank Dileo admitted paying approximately $100,000 
to individually promote each hit single released from the “Thriller” album.136  In 1985 Warner 
Music Group spent $6 million while CBS Records spent almost $13 million on independent 
promotion.
137
  For CBS, the amount spent on promotion was nearly 10% of all pretax profits.
138
  
Finally in 1986, NBC Nightly News exposed the role of independent promoters in getting music 
played on the radio in a feature news story.
139
  The scandal resulted in a second round of payola 
related litigation.  One Los Angeles promoter Joe Isgro pled guilty to tax evasion after having 
been charged with 57 felony counts including bribery, racketeering, and conspiracy to distribute 
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cocaine.
140
  All of these charges were directly related to Isgro’s work as an independent music 
promoter.
141
  The Network was damaged and payola was again curbed but would not go away 
for good. 
 The most revolutionary change in radio legislation since the Radio Act of 1927 was 
enacted with the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which resulted in significant deregulation of the 
broadcast radio industry.
142
  The goal of the 1996 Act was to “promote competition and reduce 
regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American 
telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications 
technologies.
143”  Prior to 1996, the FCC granted revocable 8 year licenses for the operation of 
radio frequencies.
144
  Station owners were required to petition for license renewals at the end of 
the license term.
145
  Following the 1996 Act, the FCC must renew a license so long as the 
licensee has committed no serious violations of the Communications Act, FCC rules, or 
otherwise exhibited a pattern of abuse on the airwaves.
146
   
 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 also repealed the national radio ownership limit 
which as of 1994, capped the number of stations a single company could own at 40.
147
  A rush of 
ownership consolidation occurred during in the decade following deregulation.  Soon after the 
1996 Act, 4,000 of America’s 11,000 radio stations changed ownership.148  In 1995 more than 
6,600 companies owned radio stations in the United States.  By 2005 there that number shrank 
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by 1/3 to slightly more than 4,400 radio station owners.
149
  Concentration of advertising revenue 
became more consolidated as well.  In 1993 the four largest radio station owners collected 12% 
of the national advertising revenue, but this figure increased to 50% of advertising revenue being 
consolidated in the top four companies by 2004.
150
  Consolidation of radio ownership aided in 
the returned growth of payola.  Record executives were now in a position to negotiate large 
promotion deals with a string of stations by talking to only one corporate entity.
151
   
 Record companies helped to create a monster through independent promotion.  The 
FCC’s limited regulatory powers only allowed the entity to exercise its discretion to investigate 
allegations of payola violations if a formal complaint was filed.
152
  If the FCC found that a 
payment for broadcast occurred without the requisite immunizing disclosure, it then was required 
to turn the investigation over to the Department of Justice for enforcement of the policy.
153
  
Procedural hurdles kept enforcement of FCC rules from occurring efficiently and being taken 
seriously.  In 2000, the nation’s largest radio station owner Clear Channel Communications was 
fined $8,000 for multiple payola violations.
154
  This fine was hardly a deterrent considering the 
company had gross revenue of almost $8 billion.
155
  Estimates suggest that $12 billion was spent 
on payola incentives by recording companies in 2001.
156
 
 Lack of federal enforcement pushed New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer to launch 
an investigation into suspected payola practices at the big four record companies Universal 
Music Group, Warner Music Group, EMI, and Sony-BMG in 2003.
157
  The investigation resulted 
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in the most significant fines imposed for violations of payola related laws to date.  More than $36 
million in fines were levied against the four companies, and each acknowledged having 
improperly paid for music to be played on the radio without on air disclosure.
158
  The effect of 
Spitzer’s crusade produced the unexpected result of shrinking and standardizing station playlists.  
Tom Calcocci, program director at KKBT in Los Angeles explained “no programmer wants to 
draw attention by choosing songs too far outside the mainstream.  Many programmers say that 
fear of regulatory scrutiny has scared them into airing fewer songs.  Instead, many stations are 
sticking to older, more tried-and-true tunes that seem less likely to prompt speculation that 
money changed hands.
159” 
 Together, broadcasters and recording companies have a complicated history that had 
developed into a symbiotic relationship where each depends upon the other to generate income.  
Legislative lobbying organizations representing the radio and recording industries have worked 
closely since the mid 1990’s to advance legislation with mutual benefits.160  The National 
Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) 
have used their common historical bond to build a sustainable future through legislation rather 
than innovation.
161
  Efforts by these organizations have threatened the growth of music based 
internet industries. 
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III.  Introduction to Internet Radio and Digital Copyright Law 
“Intellectual property law cannot be patched, retrofitted, or expanded to contain 
digitized expression any more than real estate law might be revised to cover the 
allocation of broadcasting spectrum.  We will need to develop an entirely new set 
of methods as befits this entirely new set of circumstances.”162- John Perry 
Barlow (Lyracist for the Grateful Dead and co-founder of Electronic Frontier 
Foundation.  Stated in 1994). 
 
 A.  Introduction to Internet Radio and the Technology that Drives it. 
 Over time, technology has shrunk the physical size of audio files.  In the graveyard of 
yesterday’s audio technology, one can find piano rolls, reel to reel magnetic tapes, vinyl records, 
8-track tapes, audio cassettes, mini disks, compact disks and more.  History will show that two 
key steps to bringing about internet audio technologies were the shrinking of audio files to the 
MP3 format, and increasing bandwidth.  According to the FCC, broadband high speed internet 
refers to data transmission in excess of 200,000 bits per second, or approximately 0.024 
megabytes per second.
163
  Increasing the speed at which data travels over the internet, enables 
users to receive streaming audio in real time as it is broadcast from a webcaster.
164
 
 The movement to create today’s easily transferable small digital files began materializing 
in 1988 when Leonardo Chiariglion approached the International Organization for 
Standardization with the goal of establishing a universal standard format for digital transmission 
of audio-visual content.
165
  At the time Chiarglione worked for Telecom Italia’s Centro Studie 
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Labratori Telecommunicazioni, which has been described as the “Bell Labs” of Italy.166  In the 
Spring of 1988, Chiarglione formed the Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) in order to 
invent the new audio-visual technology.  Without the assistance of music industry insiders, 
MPEG built a program known as a “codec” that was capable of shrinking large audio files to 
1/12 of their original size.
167
  The codec built MP3 files by removing audio frequencies that are 
captured by audio recordings but not registered by the human ear when listening to music 
playback.
168
  In the end, a significantly smaller file can be produced without most listeners 
noticing a difference between the original file and the shrunken MP3 file.
169
 
 The MP3 codec was improved by researchers at the University of Erlangen, Germany.
170
  
Officially, the MP3 was created there in 1992.
171
  An anonymous hacker known as SoloH stole 
the codec program from an unsecured computer at the University of Erlangen.
172
  SoloH 
improved the program so it could be used to quickly copy or “rip” compact-disk files into the 
MP3 format.  With the new program in hand, SoloH distributed the codec for free on the internet 
and the program spread quickly to end users.
173
  In the hands of end users, the MP3 codec helped 
create a culture of accepted piracy where transmission of free audio files was fast and 
inexpensive or free.
174
  Compared to the copying of previously popular audio technologies such 
as cassette tapes, the digital MP3 format was an enormous technological advance because there 
is no noticeable degradation of quality each time a reproduction is made.
175
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 One year after the MP3 was introduced to society, internet entrepreneur Carl Malamud 
launched the first computer-radio talk show, where he interviewed a different computer expert 
every week.
176
  Malamud’s early foray to internet broadcasting did not stream live as a 
“webcast,” but instead offered a series of MP3 audio files to be downloaded and played on 
computers.
177
  A year and a half later in January 1995, Malamud helped to launch the first 24 
hour a day streaming internet radio service.
178
  Produced by nonprofit organization The Internet 
Multicasting Company of Washington, Malamud’s service primarily focused on government and 
politics.
179
  Initial content included speeches and debates from both houses of Congress, 
speeches delivered at the National Press Club, and live performances from the Kennedy Center 
for the Performing Arts.
180
 
 An early hurdle for internet radio was bandwidth limitations that prevented internet users 
with phone line internet connections from being able to stream music without choppy 
interruptions.    Established in 1992, M-bone provided early technology allowing companies and 
individuals to convey audio and image data in real time over internet lines.
181
  M-Bone was used 
to air the first major internet multicast concert in November 1994, a Dallas, Texas concert 
performed by the Rolling Stones that was viewed by individuals all around the world.
182
  
Technology utilized by M-bone provided an added advantage over the technologies used by 
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Malamud.  M-bone allows live broadcasts rather than downloads of programs produced in 
advance and made available to end users on websites.
183
   
 Internet radio currently exists in several formats that are most easily distinguished as 
interactive and non-interactive.  Within these two types of stations are subcategories and varying 
business models that provide either free or for fee services.  Interactive webcasters provide 
listeners the opportunity to exert more control over the music they are listening to.  Specifically, 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act defines an interactive service as “one that enables a 
member of the public to receive a transmission of a program specially created for the recipient, 
or on request, a transmission of a particular sound recording, whether or not as part of a program, 
which is selected by or on behalf of the recipient.
184”  Examples of interactive stations include 
Lala.com, Grooveshark.com, and the European Spotify.UK.
185
  Users of these stations can select 
specific songs and artists to listen to.  One can listen to an entire album, build a specific playlist 
of songs by one or multiple artists, and may be able to utilize a personalized streaming radio 
function.  These are the sites greatly feared by the recording industry because it is believed that 
they pose a threat to album sales by providing music consumers the opportunity to hear entire 
albums on demand at no cost.
186
  Currently, the aforementioned interactive stations offer free 
services for listeners, with revenues derived from advertising income.  In Europe, Spotify plays 
short audio commercials between songs and offers users a subscription option that is 
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advertisement free.
187
  Included in the class of interactive stations are subscription services like 
Rhapsody, which offers streaming and temporary downloads for its users.
188
 
 There are two main types of non-interactive services.  First are those that operate like 
traditional terrestrial radio stations (including terrestrial stations that simulcast their analog 
broadcast digitally on the internet).  These stations broadcast a steady stream of music to all 
listeners tuning in.
189
  An example is Somafm.com, a traditional non-interactive broadcaster that 
provides 18 unique listening stations divided by genre of music.
190
  Listeners select a station to 
stream but then have no control over what music will be heard.   
 The second group of non-interactive services is more difficult to define because the 
webcasters allow listeners to have some influence over the music they hear.  Non-interactive 
stations are those that do not fit the description of an interactive station, and the determination is 
made on a case by case determination.
191
  In the course of formulating statutory law, the House 
of Representatives provided some guidance on how to distinguish interactive and non-interactive 
stations, describing interactive programs as those in which the “transmission recipient has the 
ability to move forward and backward between songs in a program… it is not necessary that the 
transmission recipient be able to select the actual songs that comprise the program.”192  On April 
17, 2000 the Digital Media Association (“DiMA”), a lobbying firm representing webcasters, 
asked the Copyright Office to adopt the following rule:  “A Service making transmissions that 
otherwise meet the requirements for the section 114(f) statutory license is not rendered 
‘interactive,’ and those ineligible for the statutory license, simply because the consumer may 
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express preferences to such Service as to the musical genres, artists and sound recordings that 
may be incorporated into the Service’s music programming to the public.”193  The Copyright 
Office declined to adopt DiMA’s recommended language, explaining that because “of the 
rapidly changing business models emerging in today’s digital marketplace, no rule can 
accurately draw the line demarcating the limits between an interactive service and a non-
interactive service.  Nor can one readily classify an entity which makes transmissions as 
exclusively interactive or non-interactive.”194  Webcasters often don’t know where they fit on the 
categorical landscape of internet radio.  The uncertainty of the law can have the chilling effect of 
deterring entrepreneurs from innovating webcasting technologies. 
 In August, 2009, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued a significant decision for the 
webcasting community.  The court held in Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., that 
webcasting services providing users with “individualized internet radio stations – the content of 
which can be affected by users’ ratings of songs, artists, and albums,” are not an interactive 
service.
195
  According to the Second Circuit, stations can operate democratically, allowing users 
to provide feedback that influences the frequency of play a song or artist receives. The two most 
successful services in this class are Pandora.com and Last.FM.  Users of these stations pick one 
or more recording artists they like, and the station then streams a personalized radio station of 
artists resembling those requested by the listener.  Users do not select the actual music they are 
hearing, allowing the stations to be classified as non-interactive.  For both types of non-
interactive stations, advertising income is the primary revenue source.  By 2001, more than 80% 
of non-interactive webcasters sold advertising time and many solicit donations from listeners.
196
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Both revenue streams enable these businesses to survive without charging subscription fees.  The 
most successful of these companies, Pandora, earned an estimated $40 million in revenue in 
2009.
197
 
 The laws in place to regulate and collect royalties from interactive and non-interactive 
internet radio stations were created before current technologies and business models were fully 
in place.  1995 is a particularly important year as it marks the birth of Malamud’s 24 hour 
streaming service
198
 and the passage of the first significant laws to effect internet radio.
199
  Law 
was created to curb threats to copyright owners before the threats even existed.  The result is a 
statutory scheme that has stifled technological and creative growth for internet entrepreneurs.  
Arguably, the laws in place damage the relationship between musicians and consumers of music 
by making it more difficult for music fans to listen to more music and be exposed to new music.   
  
 B.  Digital Copyright Law 
 Recall the discussion in section 1 regarding the lack of an exclusive right to public 
performance in sound recording copyrights.  During the seventy eight years from 1926 through 
2004, more than 25 bills were introduced in Congress with the goal of gaining a full public 
performance right in sound recordings.
200
  Many of the proposed laws pitted lobbying giants, the 
National Broadcasters Association (NAB) representing terrestrial radio industries against the 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) representing recording companies.  Past 
disputes were resolved when the RIAA and NAB opted to preserve the status quo system of 
payola and radio serving as advertising for album sales.  So long as album sales were projected 
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to increase, the RIAA constituents were content backing off calls for a public performance right 
in sound recordings.  The NAB vehemently opposed efforts of the RIAA to pass copyright 
reform legislation that would entitle sound recording owners to collect royalty payments each 
time sound recordings were broadcast publicly.
201
  With the introduction of the first internet 
radio broadcasts and easily transferable MP3 files, the RIAA and NAB formed a coalition to 
push through legislation to preemptively curb the growth of internet music technologies.
202
 
 
 i.  The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 and the Digital 
Millennium Copyright ACT of 1998. 
 The history of music copyright law as illustrated by legislation relating to the printing 
press and player piano demonstrate that a logical order of events should precede legislation.  
First, a new technology is invented that influences the way in which intellectual property is 
reproduced and distributed.  Next, new business models arise that use the new technology to 
exploit copyrighted intellectual property.  This exploitation results in the need for expanded 
rights to assure that copyright owners are adequately compensated for use of their creations.  
Laws covering internet radio were not created in this manner.  Instead, interests representing 
aging business models saw a potential threat in new digital technologies and preemptively sought 
legislation to curb that threat rather than evolve.
203
 
 In 1995 Congress passed the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording Act 
(DPRSRA), granting owners of sound recording copyrights the limited exclusive right to public 
performance of digital audio formats.
204
  Adding a sixth exclusive right for recording owners 
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meant they could now collect publishing and performance royalties for digital broadcasts for the 
first time.
205
  Royalties are allocated 50-50 between performing artists and sound recording 
copyright owners.
206
  The DPRSRA also expanded the compulsory mechanical license provision 
to digital reproductions of music files.
207
  It is the self proclaimed goal of the DPRSRA to  
“… provide copyright holders of sound recordings with the ability to control the 
distribution of their product by digital transmissions, without hampering the 
arrival of new technologies, and without imposing new and unreasonable burdens 
on radio and television broadcasters, which often promote, and appear to pose no 
threat to the distribution of sound recordings.
208”   
 
True to its goal, the DPRSRA included an exemption for terrestrial radio stations also 
broadcasting over the internet.
209
 
 The DPRSRA did not directly reference internet radio, but as intended by the RIAA and 
NAB, it has been the major influence in webcasting law.
210
  The law was enacted on the 
recording industry’s own false assumption that internet radio would be primarily paid for by 
subscription business models.
211
 In reality, internet radio evolved to be predominantly funded by 
advertising revenue.
212
  By seeking to protect older technologies, the DPRSRA required only 
webcasters who charged listeners to receive their broadcasts to make royalty payments while 
exempting broadcasters who more closely resembled free terrestrial radio broadcasts.
 213
  It was 
believed that webcasters charging for services were far more likely to broadcast through 
                                                          
205
 Wagman, supra note 51, at 98. 
206
 Copyright Royalty Board Rate Setting Proceedingshttp://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2005-1/rates-terms2005-
1.pdf, at page 11 (last visited April 22, 2010). 
207
 Moser, supra note 71, at 85. 
208
 65 Fed. Reg. 77,292 (Dec. 11, 2000) (citing S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 15 (1995)). 
209
 Spector, supra note 54, at 24. 
210
 Kidd, supra note 65, at 348.  
211
 Kohn & Kohn, supra note 22, at 1299. 
212
 Id. at 1300. 
213
 See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 366 (Nov. 1, 1995).  See 
also 17 U.S.C. § 114(f) (1995). 
38 | P a g e  
 
interactive means that allowed consumers to determine what music was played on demand.
214
    
Interactive services were thought to pose a greater danger to displacing record sales.  For 
services required to pay royalties, the DPRSRA did not set royalty rates.  The Act required 
webcasters and sound recording owners to negotiate rates independently with sound recording 
copyright owners.
215
  According to the vision of legislators, a webcaster had to negotiate with 
many record labels, artists and publishers in order to acquire licenses to broadcast a wide 
selection of music. 
 In June 1998, the RIAA wrote a letter to 40 of the most prominent non-subscription 
internet radio stations stating that a license was now required in order to stream audio recordings 
over the internet.
216
  This letter contributed to a growing rift between webcasters and the 
recording industry, as the RIAA sought to unilaterally expand the law’s interpretation of those 
rights provided in the DPRSRA.  The letter written by Steven Marks, vice president and deputy 
general counsel for the RIAA, stated “you may not realize it, but webcasting implicates the rights 
of the record companies that create those recordings.  Specifically, the reproduction of sound 
recordings in your computer hardware and digital transmission of those sound recordings require 
a license from the respective sound recording owners.”217  The RIAA demand would have 
required all streaming radio stations to pay royalties even if they were non-interactive, did not 
charge subscription fees, or were terrestrial radio stations simulcasting broadcasts over the 
internet.
218
  Although the RIAA demand was contrary to and exceeded the scope of the 
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DPRSRA, the RIAA’s tactic resulted in expanding the number of internet broadcasters required 
to pay royalties and obtain licenses.
219
 
 After receiving the RIAA letter, webcasters joined together to form the Digital Media 
Association (DiMA), which served as the lobbying organization that would battle the RIAA over 
new digital copyright laws to be considered by Congress.
220
  DiMA and the RIAA were brought 
together by the Register of Copyrights at the Copyright Office in Washington D.C. and told to 
draft proposed legislation that was mutually acceptable.  The proposed legislation was included 
by the House of Representatives in the DMCA and passed into law on August 4, 1998.
221
  
Together, the DPRSRA and DMCA amended § 114 of the Copyright Code to create three classes 
of digital broadcast mediums, those that are exempt from obtaining performance licenses, those 
subject to compulsory licenses, and those subject to negotiated licenses.
222
 
 Digital broadcasts that are exempt from paying performance royalties are those 
transmitted over traditional non-internet driven airways.
223
  An example is Hybrid Digital 
(commonly known as “HD Radio”) radio broadcasts, in which a specially equipped radio 
receiver plays data transmitted in both digital and analog signals.
224
  The broadcasts are played in 
a higher audio quality than pure analog radio, require no subscription fee, and allow for more 
stations to be broadcast than on analog only frequency radios.  Despite being digital, these 
transmissions fall under the DPRSRA-DMCA exemption and do not trigger the exclusive public 
performance right in digital sound recordings.  Broadcasts subject to the compulsory license 
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include those that are free or charge a subscription but are not interactive.
225
  End users have 
minimal or no control over what music is played and must comply with a lengthy list of 
requirements mostly intended to prevent copyright infringement.
226
  These services include 
satellite radio broadcasters Sirius-XM, as well as terrestrial radio station digital simulcasts, and 
internet only webcasters such as Soma.FM and Pandora.com.  Compulsory license eligible 
broadcasters must satisfy 13 requirements.
227
  The requirements prohibit stations from providing 
advanced notice of the songs they will broadcast, from maintaining lengthy archives of 
performances, and from repeating broadcasts within a certain period of time.
228
   
 Under the DMCA, webcasters eligible for the compulsory license could pay one industry-
negotiated rate, or a government mandated rate set by the Copyright Office.
229
  Any qualifying 
broadcaster need only to file a notice of intent to obtain a compulsory license with the Copyright 
Office.
230
  Interactive streaming services on the other hand, must negotiate directly with sound 
recording copyright holders in order to obtain a digital broadcast license.  Because users have 
control over the music they are hearing, there is a perceived heightened risk that users will 
circumvent technology to copy the audio transmission.
231
  Copyright owners are entitled to 
negotiate licenses or refuse them to all interactive broadcasters.
232
 
 In the event that copyright owners and webcasters could not independently negotiate a 
royalty rate they could petition the Librarian of Congress to convene a Copyright Arbitration 
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Royalty Panel (CARP) to determine a reasonable royalty rate.
233
  CARP replaced the Copyright 
Royalty Tribunal, established under the Copyright Act of 1976 to set statutory license rates for 
cable retransmissions, jukeboxes, and noncommercial broadcasts of protected works.
234
  In 
determining royalty rates, CARP was charged to adhere to four policy objectives:   
“(A) To maximize the availability of creative works to the public; (B) To afford 
the copyright owner a fair return for his creative work and the copyright user a 
fair income under existing economic conditions; (C) To reflect the relative roles 
of the copyright owner and the copyright user in the product made available to the 
public with respect to relative creative contribution, technological contribution, 
capital investment, cost, risk, and contribution to the opening of new markets for 
creative expression and media for their communication; (D) To minimize any 
disruptive impact on the structure of the industries involved and on generally 
prevailing industry practices.
235” 
 
 Under the CARP system a convening panel had up to 180 days to recommend royalty 
rates to the Librarian of Congress.  The Librarian would then consult the Register of Copyrights 
who had an additional 60 days to accept or reject the CARP recommendation.
236
  Parties 
submitting to CARP after being unable to negotiate a rate were told that CARP’s decision was 
based on the “willing buyer-seller standard.237”  While admirable, this goal of CARP (later 
continued by its replacement organization the Copyright Royalty Board) could never adequately 
be fulfilled considering that each CARP decision was rendered to resolve deadlocked 
negotiations between unwilling buyers and sellers.  Congress articulated the willing buyer-seller 
standard for CARP in the 1998 Copyright Code as follows:   
In establishing rates and terms for transmissions by eligible non-subscription 
services and new subscription services, the Copyright Royalty Judges shall 
establish rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates and terms that would 
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have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing 
seller. In determining such rates and terms, the Copyright Royalty Judges shall 
base its decision on economic, competitive and programming information 
presented by the parties, including— 
(i) whether use of the service may substitute for or may promote the sales of 
phonorecords or otherwise may interfere with or may enhance the sound 
recording copyright owner's other streams of revenue from its sound 
recordings; and 
(ii) the relative roles of the copyright owner and the transmitting entity in the 
copyrighted work and the service made available to the public with respect to 
relative creative contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, 
cost, and risk.
238
 
 
 The rate setting goals of CARP suggest that Congress envisioned rates to reflect nuanced 
differences among internet broadcasters.  The willing buyer-seller standard was shaped to reflect 
whether a service was likely to increase or decrease sound recording sales, and piracy.
239
  These 
goals were never truly reflected.  Instead, the RIAA and DiMA attempted to negotiate a blanket 
royalty rate for the entire industry that could sustain internet radio as a viable business and 
provide sound recording copyright holders with meaningful income.  Initially, the RIAA offered 
a flat fee of $0.004 for each song performance per listener.  It is estimated that this rate would 
equal 15% of webcaster’s gross revenue.240  DiMa’s counter offer was $0.0015 per “listener 
hour.”241  At first glance, these offers may not appear significantly different but further 
calculation shows the offers are very far from one another.  A station broadcasting to 10,000 
listeners per hour would pay $15 an hour under the DiMA plan and $400 an hour under the 
RIAA plan.
242
  Over the course of a year the DiMA plan would cost the webcaster approximately 
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$ 192,000 compared to $5.5 million under the RIAA proposal.
243
  There was no zone of possible 
agreement between the representative negotiating parties, and they entered CARP proceedings to 
resolve the rate dispute. 
 A CARP convened from July, 2000 until February, 2002 to set the compulsory licensing 
rate for the period of October, 1998 through December, 2002.
244
  Prior to its decision, one of the 
largest internet companies and radio broadcasters, Yahoo Inc. successfully negotiated a royalty 
rate with the RIAA.
245
  CARP viewed the Yahoo Inc. rate as the example of a reasonable market 
rate, and used the agreement to shape the compulsory rate for all other eligible webcasters.
246
  
This first rate required internet only webcasters to pay $0.0014 for each performance per listener, 
and $0.0007 for each performance per listener for terrestrial stations simulcasting on the 
internet.
247
  Following an appeal from the webcasters, the Librarian of Congress rejected the 
CARP rate recommendations.  Webcasters requested that the Librarian implement a revenue 
based royalty scheme.
248
  The Librarian rejected the request, based on a belief that a per-
performance rate is more closely tied to the spirit of the public performance right held by 
copyright owners.
249
  The Librarian set the compulsory rate for all internet broadcasters at 
$0.00074 for each performance, per listener.
250
  In rejecting the CARP rate, the Librarian sought 
parity among terrestrial and non-terrestrial broadcasters and continued the practice of using a one 
size fits all royalty rate to represent the willing buyer-seller standard. 
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2000-2002 CARP Hearings 
Party recommendation 
or determination 
Rate Estimated Hourly Fee 
10,000 listener hours 
(15 songs/hour) 
Estimated Annual Fee 
10,000 listener hours 
(15 songs/hour) 
RIAA $0.004 per song per 
listener 
$600 $5,256,000 
DiMA $0.0015 per listener 
hour 
$15 $131,400 
CARP $0.0014 per song per 
listener 
$210 $1,839,600 
Librarian of Congress $0.00074 $111 $972,360 
 
 
 ii. Subsequent Changes and Current Royalty Rates 
 Rates issued by the Librarian of Congress were viewed as burdensome by webcasters.  In 
September of 2002, Representative James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) introduced the Small 
Webcaster Amendment Act (SWAA) which sought to give webcasters and the RIAA more time 
to negotiate royalty rates by delaying implementation of the new rates by six-months.
251
  Before 
the SWAA was debated in the Senate, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) introduced an amendment to 
the SWAA that later became law as the Small Webcasters Settlement Act (SWSA).
252
  The 
SWSA authorized SoundExchange, the then RIAA controlled entity responsible for collecting 
internet royalties, the authority to directly negotiate royalty rates with small webcasters.
253
  A 
subsequent agreement was negotiated between SoundExchange, and The Voice of Webcasters, a 
collective formed to represent several small webcasters.
254
  The agreement required webcasters 
to pay the greater of 8% gross revenues or 5% of expenses, covering the time from the passage 
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of the DMCA through the end of 2002.
255
  During the years 2003 and 2004, webcasters paid the 
greater of 10% of the first $250,000 in revenue and 12% of gross revenues above that amount, or 
7% of expenses.
256
  All webcasters were required to pay a minimum $500 per year for 1998, and 
a minimum of $2,000 per year for 1999 through 2002.
257
  For 2003 and 2004, those webcasters 
with gross revenues exceeding $50,000 per year had to pay an increased minimum of $5,000 per 
year.
258
  Arguably, these rates more closely reflect the spirit of the willing buyer-seller standard 
than those established by CARP or the Librarian of Congress, because royalties are tied to and 
capped in relation to revenue. 
 Despite the positive aspects of the new SoundExchange rates, significant problems 
remained.
259
  Webcasters seeking to directly negotiate with SoundExchange instead of accepting 
The Voice of Webcaster’s rate had extremely limited bargaining power in negotiations.260  The 
decision for webcasters was to accept the royalty rate offered by SoundExchange, or opt instead 
for the higher rate offered by the Librarian of Congress.
261
  Many webcasters stopped 
broadcasting due to burdensome royalty fees.  Even Clear Channel, the largest owner of 
terrestrial radio stations, stopped streaming simulcasts for approximately 150 of its stations, 
citing high webcasting royalty fees as the unconquerable hurdle.
262
  A national “Day of Silence” 
was held on May 1, 2002, on which webcasters spent a day on strike from broadcasting music to 
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show their frustrations to legislators and the RIAA.
263
  The Congressional goal of establishing 
royalty rates based on the willing buyer-seller standard had yet to be realized, and stability for 
the recording industry and webcasters had yet to arrive as more changes were on the horizon. 
 On March 27, 2003, Congressman Lamar Smith (R-TX) introduced the Copyright 
Royalty Reform and Distribution Act.
264
  The act replaced CARP with the Copyright Royalty 
Board (CRB) which consists of three copyright royalty judges serving terms that are staggered 
and range from two to six years on the board.
265
  In 2007, the CRB issued the first royalty rate 
determination since 2002, and used the same willing buyer-seller standard formerly used by 
CARP.
266
  Hearings for the determination began in 2005, and the CRB considered written 
statements of twenty-three interested parties.
267
  The CRB justified its attempt to establish a one-
size fits all royalty rate that could reflect the “significant variations among both buyers and 
sellers in terms of sophistication, economic resources, business exigencies and myriad other 
factors”268 by finding that Congress intended the CRB to determine webcasting rates “absent 
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special circumstances.”269  Once again, reality showed that a one size fits all royalty scheme 
cannot adequately model a true willing buyer-seller standard. 
 CRB’s determination reflected prior findings by CARP and the Librarian of Congress.  
Commercial webcasters were required to pay a per-performance royalty, while noncommercial 
broadcasters such as National Public Radio could pay a flat annual fee per station.
270
  Under the 
CRB’s April 2007 determination, noncommercial webcasters paid an annual fee of $500 per 
station up to a total of 159,140 aggregate tuning hours (total listener hours) per month.
271
  
Broadcasts exceeding the aggregate tuning hour limit paid the commercial webcaster rate for 
remaining broadcasts.
272
  Commercial webcasters were required to pay $500 per station, which is 
used to offset additional fees for broadcasts per listener.  The per play listening rate was 
scheduled at $0.0008 for 2006, $0.0011 for 2007, $0.0014 for 2008, $0.0018 for 2009, and 
$0.0019 for 2010.
273
  Consider the fees incurred by America Online music, which averaged 
210,694 listeners per streamed song during November 2006.
274
  Under the 2007 CRB 
determination, America Online retroactively owed $1.65 million in public performance sound 
recording royalties for the month of November 2006.
275
 
 These rates continued to threaten the existence of internet radio stations.  In 2008, 
Congress passed the Webcaster Settlement Act, delaying implementation of the 2007 rates to 
                                                          
269
 Brian Flavin, A Digital Cry for Help:  Internet Radio’s Struggle to Survive a Second Royalty Rate Determination 
Under the Willing Buyer/Seller Standard, 27 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 427, 445 (2008) (Citing CRB Determination, 
72 Fed. Reg. at 24,085-86). 
270
 Id. at 447. 
271
 Copyright Royalty Board Proceeding http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2005-1/rates-terms2005-1.pdf at pages 
61-62 (last visited April 22, 2010). 
272
 Id. 
273
 Id. at 47. 
274
 Eliot Van Buskirk, Royalty Hike Panics Webcasters, Wired March 6, 2007. 
275
 Id. 
48 | P a g e  
 
allow webcasters to engage in direct royalty negotiations with SoundExchange.
276
  In July 2009, 
a new agreement was reached between webcasters and SoundEchange that covers broadcasting 
for the period from 2006 through 2015.
277
  The deal applies to companies making most of their 
money from non-interactive internet streaming broadcasts, and excludes many simulcasting 
broadcasters like CBS Radio.
278
  Small webcasters, defined as those earning less than $1.25 
million in annual revenues pay 12-14% of revenue in royalties with a minimum annual payment 
of $25,000.
279
  Larger webcasters pay the greater of 25% of revenue or a fee per listener stream 
that will increase by 57% from $0.0008 in 2006 to $0.0014 in 2015.
280
  Calculating royalty fees 
by assuming 10,000 listeners and 15 songs per hour, rates will increase from $120/hour to 
$210/hour.  Over the course of nine years, rates will increase from $1,051,200 to $1,839,600.  By 
tying royalty fees to revenue, webcasters are better equipped to organize their business growth 
and anticipate royalty expenses.  The negotiations resulted in a closer relationship between 
SoundExchange and webcasters, who now provide SoundExchange with more elaborate data 
regarding what songs are streamed and to whom they are streamed to.
281
 
 The most recent rates, established through negotiation are a positive step representing the 
willpower of internet radio stations to continue their growth against a backdrop of high costs and 
operational fees.  The DPRSRA and DMCA were enacted before internet radio technologies and 
business models had the opportunity to mature.  As a result, subsequent legislation and royalty 
rate adjustments over the past fifteen years have been tweaking the original legislation to bring it 
more closely in line with market realities.  Internet technologies have emerged as the next big 
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broadcasting mechanism.  Consumer desires drive internet technologies, not control or 
copyright.
282
  It is the consumer who gives value to delivery mechanisms as well as copyrighted 
materials.
283
  The marketplace of consumers demands that internet radio continue to evolve and 
deliver new dynamic ways for individuals to interact with and consume their music. 
IV. The Current Business Outlook for Webcasters 
 Passage of the DPRSRA in 1995 and the DMCA in 1998 ushered in an era of law that has 
handicapped the growth of internet radio businesses.  These laws were drafted prematurely 
without proper understanding of the technology and business models they would be stifling.  
There exists an ongoing war of recording industry superpowers against technologies that threaten 
their outdated business models.
284
  Led by the RIAA and the 4 major recording labels, 
subsequent legislation and SoundEchange negotiations taking place during the 2000’s occurred 
against a backdrop of piracy fears and dwindling record sale income for recording companies.  
From the advent of Napster in 1999 to 2008 the recording industry lost an estimated $20 billion 
dollars in decreased sales revenue.
285
  Internet technologies have been viewed as suspect by 
executives at the major labels even when legal and royalty income producing.   
 In February 2010, Warner Music Group CEO Edgar Bronfman Jr.
286
 told BBC News that 
his company would only license music to subscription services.
287
  Bronfman Jr. said “free 
                                                          
282
 Patry, supra note 90, at xx. 
283
 Id. 
284
 Id. at xv. 
285
 IFPI, Recorded Music Sales 2008, http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/Recorded-Music-Sales-2008.pdf (showing 
that global sales of recorded music totaled $18,415,200,000 in 2008).  And IFPI, 2000 Recording Industry World 
Sales, April 2001, http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/worldsales2000.pdf (showing that global sales of recorded 
music totaled $38,900,000,000) (last visited April 22, 2010). 
286
 Kenneth N. Gilpin & Eric Schmitt, Edgar Bronfman Jr. In Line at Seagram, The New York Times, Feb 27, 1986 
(Edgar Bronfman Jr. has a curious past that may shed light on his business policy decisions at Warner Music Group.  
Bronfman Jr. is a member of one of the wealthiest Canadian families, who owned the beverage enterprise Seagram 
Company.  Bronfman Jr. never attended college but was anointed at age 30 to be the next CEO of Seagram 
Company.  Comments made by Bronfman Jr. that aggressively challenge free access to music make a great deal of 
sense behind the context of his family history.  The liquor industry is heavily regulated by government and generally 
considered recession proof.  Moreover, nobody drinks for free.). 
50 | P a g e  
 
streaming services are clearly not net positive for the industry and as far as Warner Music is 
concerned will not be licensed.  The get all your music you want for free… is not the kind of 
approach to business that we will be supporting in the future.”288  Bronfman’s opinion aside, data 
suggests that musicians and the public are fans of internet radio technology.  The rights afforded 
to sound recording copyright owners under the DPRSRA will not be repealed, however the 
royalty structure must be revised to fulfill the goals of the DPRSRA so new technological growth 
is encouraged and copyright owners feel fairly compensated.
289
 
 The first decade of the new millennium welcomed the maturity of digital music.  The 
decade began with Naptster, which illegally delivered 2.71 billion copyrighted files per month
290
 
and ended with unlimited free legal streaming of music through Pandora, Spotify, and 
Grooveshark among other services.
291
  Contemporaneous to the 2003 filing of more than 38,000 
lawsuits by the RIAA against music fans for alleged piracy,
292
 musicians embraced digital music 
technologies.  According to the Pew Center, by 2004, 83% of musicians independently provided 
free samples or previews of their music on the internet as a means of connecting with fans and 
promoting music.
293
  Trends show that consumers of music are also increasing their use of 
internet streaming music.  At its height, Napster had 26.4 million users around the globe.
294
  By 
mid 2009, an estimated 69 million Americans listened to internet radio monthly.
295
  At least 20% 
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of 25-54 year olds listen to internet radio weekly.
296
  Data strongly suggests that internet radio 
and other authorized legal streaming mechanisms are replacing piracy and terrestrial radio as the 
preferred music listening process.
297
 
 Teenagers have long been a crucial demographic target for consumption.  Use of internet 
radio among 13-17 year olds is on the rise.  In 2007 only 34% of teenagers were listening to 
internet radio, but only one year later the percent increased to 52%.
298
  Accompanying the rise of 
teenager use of internet radio is the declining use of piracy facilitating technology.  Among 
teenagers during the same time period, piracy through peer to peer downloading dropped by 6% 
and CD burning fell an estimated 28%.
299
  Similar trends are exhibited among other demographic 
groups. 
 Piracy is a global issue that is not limited to teenagers.  Looking overseas, Spotify has 
gained great fanfare in Europe as a free on demand music streaming service.  Launched in 
October of 2008, Spotify had more than 6 million users within its first year of operation.
300
  Rob 
Wells, senior Vice-President of digital music at Universal Music Group International, estimates 
that 60-80% of Spotify users in various European nations are former peer to peer music 
pirates.
301
  Spotify has avoided launching in the U.S. due to higher royalty rates compared to 
those of Europe.
302
  In its first year of operation, Spotify provided royalty income to copyright 
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owners
303
 for the consumption of their music by up to 4.8 million people who used to steal their 
music.  Internet radio currently provides sound recording owners with income they would 
otherwise be deprived of through common thievery. 
 Pandora is one of the great success stories in the internet radio community.  Founded in 
2000, Pandora began building the Music Genome Project.
304
  Developed by university trained 
musicologists, the genome consists of nearly 400 unique attributes that correspond to different 
elements of songs.
305
  Pandora categorizes music sharing common attributes and delivers them to 
end users as a personalized radio station.
306
  In 2008, Pandora had more than 15 million 
registered users who streamed personalized stations based upon a single artist or song that they 
are fans of.
307
  That number grew to surpass 27 million in 2009.
308
  Pandora will analyze any 
music that is delivered to them, and they will most often enter the music into the database, 
making it potentially retrievable by millions of people.
309
  According to Joe Kennedy, President 
and CEO of Pandora Media, Inc., of more than 60,000 artists whose music is in the Genome, 
70% are not affiliated with a major record label, and more than 50% are independent 
musicians.
310
  The high degree of independent musicianship on Pandora is common among other 
internet radio stations, and may be a major reason executives at the largest record labels share the 
                                                          
303
 Robert Andrews, Spotifies Mean Online Now Filling UK’s CD Royalty Gap, Paid Content:UK, March 14, 2010, 
available at http://paidcontent.co.uk/article/419-spotifies-mean-online-now-filling-uks-cd-royalty-gap/. 
304
 Pandora Corporate Information, http://www.pandora.com/corporate/ (last visited April 22, 2010). 
305
 Id. 
306
 Joe Kennedy, Testimony of Joe Kennedy, President & CEO of Pandora Media, Inc.  Senate Judiciary Committee 
Hearing on Music and Radio in the 21
st
 Century: Assuring Fair Rates and Rules Across Platforms, July 29, 2008.  
307
 Id. 
308
 Meg Tirrell Pandora Media Founder Sees Company’s First Profit Next Year Bloomberg, may 19, 2009.   
available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aaKvHKT2hji0 (last visited April 22, 
2010). 
309
 Joe Kennedy, supra note 306. 
310
 Id. 
53 | P a g e  
 
anti-internet radio views of Edgar Bronfman Jr.
311
  When independent artists are played, larger 
companies don’t get paid.  Conglomerate copyright owners often view themselves as victims 
who are losing market share in the music industry each time independent distribution and 
promotion becomes easier for artists.
312
 
 Pandora earned $19 million in revenue during 2008, and estimated its revenue to reach 
$40 million in 2009.
313
  Under the 2009 royalty agreement between SoundExchange and large 
webcasters, Pandora’s estimated 2009 minimum royalty payout was $10 million.314  More than 
90% of Pandora’s 2009 revenue came from advertising.315  Pandora’s revenue stream is typical 
for most internet radio services and advertisers continue to flock toward internet radio.  During 
the first quarter of 2009, internet advertising revenue increased 13% while terrestrial network 
radio advertising revenue declined by 13%.
316
  Advertisers pay substantial sums of money to 
have their advertisements played in-between streaming songs reaching millions of consumers.  
Users of the free Pandora service hear only two or three targeted 15-second commercials per 
hour.
317
  Pandora founder Tom Westergren explains the effectiveness of Pandora’s advertising.  
“We’re not delivering an ad for a women’s clothing store to men, or a bar or alcohol-related 
event to minors.  Everything is delivered based on the information of the listener.”318  Pandora 
offers a $3 monthly advertisement free subscription service, but has not attracted a large 
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audience.
319
  In the UK, roughly 5% of Spotify users pay a monthly fee of roughly $14 (actual 
fee is £9.99 GBP) for advertisement free music.
320
  Currently there is an ongoing philosophical 
debate between recording company executives and internet radio companies regarding the 
perceived lost value of music when it is given away for free at greater access and more user 
control than exists with terrestrial radio. 
 Spotify CEO and co-founder Daniel Ek sees a shift in consumer desires.  “There will 
always be a place for ownership, but as access to content improves, I think we’ll see many more 
people move toward this model.  I love my vinyl and I love finding whatever I want to hear on 
my mobile.  What’s important is giving fans the widest variety of choice.”321  In the minds of the 
big four record companies, it often seems that no amount of royalty income obtained through 
internet radio will be enough until profits balloon to figures last seen in the 1990s.
322
  David 
Ring, Vice President of business development and business affairs at Universal Music Group’s 
eLabs, told Billboard Magazine “I don’t think there’s enough value in that (ad-supported) 
business for anybody.”323  Like Warner Music Group, Universal shows a greater interest in 
licensing to subscription services.  Ring continued, “We’re always trying to drive up-sell to 
transactions, up-sell to bundles and purchase.  But we definitely are not looking at the hope and 
the prayer that giving away free streaming will somehow magically convert people into 
buyers.”324  Everyone likes free, consumers of music are no exception.  The comments of David 
Ring and Edgar Bronfman Jr., appear to overlook the up-selling that comes with free internet 
radio. 
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 Most internet radio services offer direct links to purchase music, view album art, artist 
biographies, album reviews, and tour information.
325
  More music was purchased in 2008 than 
any year in history, and digital sales continue to replace physical music sales.
326
  With iTunes’ 
current status as the largest music retailer,
327
 there is no denying that providing links to interact 
with and purchase music is beneficial to producing public performance and mechanical sales 
royalties for sound recording copyright owners.  Apple, Inc. broadened its stake in the internet 
music market by purchasing Lala.com in December of 2009.
 328
  Lala offers a unique hybrid 
business model compared to other music streaming services.  The service will scan a user’s 
computer for owned music and allow the user to listen to that music from any internet access 
point for free.
329
  Lala allows users to store their record collection in the great internet cloud, 
leaving the hard-drive behind.  Individuals can listen to songs that have not been purchased one 
time for free.  A web only license enabling unlimited internet listening can be purchased for 
$0.10 per song, and a full purchase can be made for $0.89 per song.
330
  Apple has taken an 
aggressive approach in growing Lala by making the acquisition price of songs generally lower on 
Lala than offered through the iTunes store. 
 During the first month Lala Launched its interactive service, 10% of users registered a 
credit card to facilitate music purchases.
331
  Among these users, nearly 1 song was purchased for 
every 5 songs streamed.
332
  Listeners of internet radio are directly connected to digital music 
stores and the websites of artists.  This connectivity creates a two for one benefit for sound 
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recording owners.  Using Lala consumers as an example, it is conceivable that sound recording 
owners will be paid royalties for all audio streams, and receive a mechanical royalty for song 
sales an additional 20% of the time.  A divergence of opinion exists between independent artists 
and large recording companies.  Independent artists are finding more avenues to earn money and 
gain control over distribution of their music, while the major labels have experienced falling 
revenue and a loss of control over their traditional business model.  
 Traditionally, recording companies acted as gatekeepers of music distribution.
333
  Before 
the MP3, consumers of music traveled to brick and mortar music stores to acquire new music.  
Recording companies provided investment funding to promising artists in order to fund the $1 it 
costs to manufacture a CD.
334
  Funding the manufacturing and shipment of physical albums was 
accompanied by a risk of oversupplying the market with goods that would not sell.
335
  The MP3 
has provided society with a supply and demand risk-proof product.  Because MP3’s do not 
consume physical space, can be reproduced at minimal to no cost, and can be purchased from 
any location with an internet connection, little investment or risk accompanies the sale of MP3 
music files.
336
  For recording companies, the shift from atoms technology to bits technology 
represents a loss of control, a changing of the guard with respect to old business models.
337
  
Record companies grew accustomed to controlling access to terrestrial radio, access to record 
music stores, and access to home stereos.  The DPRSRA and DMCA have created a scenario 
through which artists, sound recording copyright owners, and music consumers can all benefit in 
diverse ways from the existence of internet radio. 
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 Internet radio provides targeted audience advertising for musicians that simply cannot be 
obtained on terrestrial radio.  Services that utilize technology similar to Pandora’s Genome, 
deliver music that is directly tailored to a music listener’s personal taste.  Through a democratic 
process that allows listeners to approve or disapprove of streamed songs, the likelihood of a 
music purchase following a stream can be greatly increased.
338
  Internet radio stations commonly 
have 95% more songs in rotation than terrestrial radio, enabling more artists to be discovered and 
streamed to fans specifically seeking to hear similar music.
339
  Many services including Lala, 
Pandora, Blip, and Grooveshark allow listeners to share songs, playlists and stations with 
friends.
340
  The aforementioned sites allow listeners to publish a declaration of the music being 
consumed on social networking sites Facebook and Twitter.  On demand service Grooveshark 
allows an entire playlist to be sent to friends.  Unlike terrestrial radio, music broadcasted on the 
internet is more likely to reach a targeted buying audience and copyright owners are paid when 
their songs are played.  The opportunity to be delivered music by unknown artists who match a 
listener’s self described taste in music has increased the ease of discovering new artists.  Social 
network publication of one’s newly discovered music on Pandora or Grooveshark can result in a 
viral effect through which one’s circle of peers start listening to and spending money on newly 
discovered musicians. 
 The phenomena of music consumers acting as disk jockeys, sharing newly discovered 
music with peers is replacing the tight control over broadcasting previously held by major 
recording companies with a people’s democracy.  Accompanying the democratic music 
movement is the opportunity for artists to circumvent costly terrestrial radio payola laws, to pay 
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for plays and exposure on internet radio.  Last.FM and Jango.com are among several internet 
stations that allow bands to pay for song plays.
341
  Through Last.FM, artists can buy 500 plays 
for $100, 1,000 plays for $200 and 2,000 plays for $400.
342
  According to one music executive, 
industry standard for fan acquisition cost is $1 to $2.
343
  The cost of paying for plays on targeted 
internet radio is within this reasonable spectrum when considering the interactive nature of 
internet radio listening.  Last.FM even offers artists the ability to bypass SoundExchange and 
collect performance royalty payments directly from the webcasting service each time a song is 
played.
344
  Adding to the potential benefits, musicians can track useful consumer data through 
internet radio services.  Grooveshark and others track listener trends and geographical locations 
of users.
345
  Musicians can use this data to target touring and promotion activities to those 
audiences proven to be drawn to their music. 
 Surprisingly, data regarding the music played through on demand services suggests that 
the fears of large labels are unfounded.  Looking at the first six months of Spotify user data in the 
UK, approximately one billion songs were streamed to 2.7 million users.
346
  This is an average of 
370 streams per user over six months.  Of the 4.5 million songs available on Spotify’s service, 
one third, or 1.5 million were never streamed.
347
  While users often exposed themselves to new 
music, the overwhelming choice was to listen to familiar songs whose sound recording 
copyrights are most often owned by recording labels.  The top 100,000 songs played during the 
six months in question accounted for 80% of all streamed songs on Spotify.
348
  Copyright owners 
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may sense that they would earn more money through outright purchases of music than through 
streams.  This is speculative however, because streaming royalties are the gift that keeps on 
giving each time a song is played.  Recording companies and independent artists all stand to see 
regular royalty income delivered when their music is streamed.  Because the listener has no 
financial risk of purchasing music they don’t like, listener frequency to internet radio and thus 
royalty payouts can increase. 
 
 
V. Conclusion: Where the Law Must Head 
 The laws overseeing internet radio are intended to control intellectual property.  In the 
words of a Manhattan federal court, “Intellectual property regimes are economic legislation 
based on policy decisions that assign rights based on assessments of what legal rules will 
produce the greatest economic good for society as a whole.”349  The rise of copyright law 
brought on by publishing, and the rise of music laws since the advent of the player piano 
demonstrate a natural order of events that helps to assure the greatest economic good for society 
is achieved through legislation.  Ideally, the process begins with innovative technology affecting 
the ways in which intellectual property is distributed, consumed, or created.  Businesses arise or 
shift their business models to exploit the new technology, creating implications for the creators 
and owners of intellectual property.  Finally, the owners of the property seek new laws to restore 
balance and assure adequate compensation and limitations to the use of new technologies in 
distributing and reproducing their works.  With internet radio law, the third step preceded the 
second one. 
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 Since 1995, there have been adjustments to royalty rates and the methods of determining 
how these rates will be set and varied depending on the technology used.  The key interests at 
stake are many.  There are internet radio companies fighting for survival, and terrestrial radio 
stations who, through the representation of the NAB, have fought to suppress internet radio by 
adding costly royalty fees.  Musicians have overwhelmingly supported internet radio as a new 
medium to interact with fans, while large recording companies continue to fight internet radio as 
the profits of the CD boom era drift further into the past.  Finally, there are the interests of 
consumers.  Those individuals who give music its monetary value
350
 have migrated in mass 
numbers toward the use of passive and interactive internet radio.  By keeping royalty rates 
reasonable across all platforms, each of the five aforementioned interest groups can benefit from 
the growth of internet radio. 
 A.  Shape Royalty Rates to Better Fulfill the Goals of the DPRSRA 
 Legislators, copyright owners, and the internet radio industry should seek to fulfill the 
articulated goal of the DPRSRA during future negotiations.  As noted in section III, the 
DPRSRA seeks to (i) provide copyright owners with distribution control of their products 
through digital means (ii) without hurting the growth of new technologies and (iii) without 
imposing unreasonable burdens on broadcasters posing no threat to the distribution of sound 
recordings.
351
  Some of these concerns have been answered by subsequent agreements and 
legislation, while others remain in need of adjustment. 
 Control for copyright owners under the DPRSRA should be narrowly interpreted as 
assuring the existence of anti-piracy mechanisms and delivery of royalties as well as streaming 
data.  The DMCA added more assurances regarding piracy concerns and, under the most recent 
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royalty agreement between webcasters and SoundExchange, there will be more substantial 
accounting and delivery of data regarding when and how songs are streamed.
352
  To fulfill the 
second goal, royalty rates must be kept low enough to encourage market competition and 
innovation of technologies.  If royalty rates grow too high, there is a detrimental risk of station 
consolidation similar to that seen after deregulation of terrestrial radio in 1996.  Societal interests 
are better served by the fostering of arts that will continue to occur if more artists are broadcast 
to more listeners over internet pipelines.
353
  By continuing to require an annual per-station fee 
that counts toward royalty payment calculations, copyright owners are protected from an 
oversupply market that could devalue music.  The per-station fee establishes a floor, assuring 
that new stations will cease to be founded if advertisement or subscription revenue cannot be 
realized to a level sufficient to pay the minimum annual fee. 
 A statutory rate should be applied to interactive streaming services.  The rate should be 
slightly higher than that applied to passive streaming, because of the added control held by the 
listener and the possibility of displacing sales income.  An absence of fair bargaining power 
exists currently where individual services are required to negotiate with copyright owners 
individually to establish royalty rates.  The use of “most favored nations” clauses by record 
companies encourages copyright holders to refrain from engaging in meaningful bilateral 
negotiations with webcasters.
354
  SoundExchange can honor the desires of copyright owners who 
oppose interactive streaming by establishing an “opt-out” escape hatch for owners.  
SoundExchange should consider maintaining a two tiered catalogue of all sound recordings 
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administered by the agency, to presume inclusion on interactive stations but allowing for owners 
to opt out.  
 
 B.  Acknowledge The Fiction of a Willing-Buyer Willing-Seller Standard 
 Conceptually, the willing buyer-seller standard is worth seeking among rate-setters.  In 
reality however, there are far more nuances to the market that make the concept pure fiction.  
The incentive for licensing exists through statutory regulations.
355
  Webcasters are forced to 
accept the rate set by the CRB or negotiate with SoundExchange.  When a market has a single 
seller, there exists a unilateral market, not one consisting of willing buyers and sellers.  It is 
essential for the improvement of future negotiations that legislators, the CRB, copyright owners 
and webcasters recognize the fiction of the willing buyer-seller standard. 
 The most recent negotiations between SoundExchange and webcasters demonstrate that 
bilateral talks can be successful.  By achieving a more favorable rate than that produced by the 
CRB, the negotiations demonstrate that the CRB has continued a tradition started by CARP that 
subjectively favors the RIAA and large copyright owners when setting rates.  The recent 
agreement is far from perfect.  Webcasters have been forced to negotiate a blanket deal that may 
not adequately address the nuanced differences in business goals, models, and revenue streams.  
It must be recognized by the necessary parties that a willing buyer-seller standard cannot be 
formulated in a “one size fits all” form.  Instead, the CRB, copyright owners and webcasters 
should exercise more flexibility in honoring the nuances of the internet radio market.   
 Flexibility should provide webcasters with additional options for determining how 
royalties will be computed.  Parties should consider providing more options for large and small 
webcasters to choose a method of tabulating fees that works best with a webcaster’s business 
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model.  SoundExchange should facilitate a program allowing sound recording copyright owners 
to accept one of three streaming royalty rates.  By providing copyright owners the opportunity to 
charge a lower statutory fee for streaming their music, internet stations may be more likely to 
play less expensive artists.  This in turn can foster creativity and competition among musicians, 
and enable independent or new artists the opportunity to generate more exposure.  Those artists 
who are more established and wish to charge more for their music to be played will likely 
continue to be streamed frequently due to popular demand.  Providing copyright owners and 
webcasters with pricing options will open up competition by encouraging experimentation with 
new business models.  Pricing tiers can mitigate the current problem of SoundExchange acting as 
the unilateral seller in the market place of streaming music. 
 
 C.  Address Payola as a Past and Future Concern 
 A future danger lurking in the shadows of internet radio, is the potential rise of payola on 
internet airways.  The RIAA and NAB used their collective and questionable historical 
relationship to lobby Congress to pass the DPRSRA as a preemptive strike on internet radio.
356
  
With the initial survival of internet radio, and its continued rise to replace terrestrial radio as the 
favored broadcast mechanism for hearing music, payola may find a home on internet radio.  
Currently, there is no legislation requiring disclosure when songs are paid to be played on 
internet radio and stations have taken advantage of this by allowing copyright owners to pay for 
exposure.
357
 
 One policy rationale behind terrestrial radio payola laws is to inform passive listeners 
when the music they hear is played based on sponsorship rather than the merits and quality of a 
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song or artist.
358
  This danger is mitigated on semi-interactive services where listeners have the 
power to skip a song.  Legislators should consider extending disclosure requirements to internet 
radio to prevent wealthy copyright owners from squeezing independent musicians out of the 
market by outspending them by purchasing webcasting plays.  Disclosure when payments are 
made should be required or payments should be outlawed entirely.   
 The risk of payola driven internet broadcasting is certain to grow as copyright owners 
continue to accept the internet as the world’s preferred broadcast medium.  If the current 
resistance to internet radio exhibited by the major record companies wanes, there might be an 
influx of spending by these companies as an attempt to exert influence and control over 
webcaster airwaves.  Although conglomerate copyright owners have lost some control over the 
ways in which music is distributed, these companies still have more financial resources than 
independent musicians and recording labels.  Warner Music Group and Universal Music Group 
could conceivably begin buying plays on Last.FM and other stations, to increase the exposure 
given to their sound recording copyrights.  If this happens, the ills of payola on terrestrial radio 
will be replicated, including consolidated play lists and bribes.  A mechanism must be put in 
place to prevent the corruption of internet radio and to preserve its presence as a democratic and 
merit based venue for music. 
 D.  The Major Labels 
 Frustrations voiced by Edgar Bronfman Jr., and other major label executives are 
representative of the diminishing role of record companies as distributors of music.  Distribution 
and supply of capital were the primary roles provided by recording companies throughout the 
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twentieth century.
359
  Internet radio is quickly becoming a primary distribution stream for music, 
and may one day become the primary way in which sound recording copyright owners earn 
royalty income.  Services like Pandora, and the internet at large have made it significantly easier 
and less expensive for musicians to promote themselves and to develop careers without signing a 
traditional recording contract.  The big four labels, Sony-BMG, EMI, Universal and Warner will 
continue to lose revenue and influence unless they take affirmative steps to provide consumers 
and musicians with the services they desire.  Services provided should include non subscription 
internet radio. 
 Sony-BMG and Universal Music Group have invested millions of dollars in interactive 
subscription service MOG.com.
360
  MOG has licensing deals with all four of the major labels, 
and charges $5 a month to subscribers.
361
  The goal of up-selling content
362
 will not provide an 
effective long term revenue stream so long as opportunities to listen to music exist where the 
royalty costs are paid for entirely by advertisers.  If record company sentiment is that not enough 
royalty revenue is paid by legal internet radio stations, the record companies should compete and 
provide their own better stations.  There are minimal content laws governing internet radio, any 
of the labels could host their own radio services online and charge outside advertisers to sponsor 
the stations.  Record companies could then cut out the middle man, keep all advertisement 
revenue and increase the income derived from their own exploitation of owned sound recording 
copyrights. 
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 If Edgar Bronfman Jr. were to lead the fight against internet radio by refusing to license 
Warner Music Group’s music to interactive non-subscription services, musicians on his label 
would lose out.  With more than 69 million Americans listening to internet radio on a regular 
basis,
363
 Warner Music Group would likely be pressured to issue licenses and rejoin the world of 
internet radio due to lost royalty profits and pressure from their own content producers, the 
musicians.  Music is made to be listened to, and recording companies exist primarily to deliver 
music and fund its creation.  Record labels should experiment more actively with free internet 
radio options, because they produce revenue that can be used to fund music creation, and provide 
an inexpensive distribution stream to target audiences. 
 
 E. A Final Word 
 Copyright law can be traced as far back as Ancient Greece.  As societies grow and 
technologies are invented, the law and industry adjust to accept or reject new technologies.  
Determinations should be made in favor of providing the greatest benefit to society as a whole.
364
  
Although it can take substantial time, eventually harmony is reached between the law, content 
providers, content distributors, and consumers.  Since the DPRSRA was passed in 1995, there 
has been a steady march to seek harmony among these parties so that internet radio can exist as a 
viable business and service to all of society’s music creators owners and consumers.  The 2009 
negotiations between SoundExchange and webcasters represent a breakthrough toward harmony 
of law.   
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 Today the debate over internet radio can be framed as a philosophical one.  Society must 
determine whether music loses “value” when it is given away for free at greater access and with 
more user control than exists with terrestrial radio.  I believe the answer is no, music does not 
lose value in the context of free internet radio.  Sound recording and composition copyright 
owners receive a steady stream of royalty income from internet radio.  It should not matter if 
revenue is paid for by advertisers or consumers of music, so long as a sustainable income is 
obtained by creative entities and distributive businesses.  The RIAA and major record 
companies, together with the NAB and terrestrial broadcasters, must accept that internet radio is 
here to stay.  Musicians and consumers have demonstrated their desire for this technology.  
Consumers have demonstrated a willingness to receive advertisements or pay modest 
subscriptions as a means to recognize value of the music they hear.  Industry battles over 
copyright schemes are based on changes in technology and business models.
365
  Now it is up to 
the RIA and NAB to adjust their models so as to remain relevant and successful in the coming 
decades. 
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